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Linking Organization and Field Level Analyses: 
The Diffusion of Corporate Environmental Practice 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the diffusion of corporate environmental practice in the context of field 
level dynamics. It builds a conceptual model that makes links between (1) the complex 
constituency of the institutional field driving environmental concerns, (2) the multiple cultural 
frames that emerge from that constituency, and (3) the corresponding structural and cultural 
routines that become enacted within firms. It offers contributions for research in the domains of 
both environmental practice and institutional theory. For environmental practice, this paper 
attends to the genesis and diffusion of environmental practice that go beyond individual 
organization level. For institutional theory, this paper moves beyond the traditional focus on 
isomorphism and elaborates the processes of field-level dynamics. It shows how field level 
heterogeneity can occur by depicting inertia, traditionally a phenomenon attributed to the field, 
as the result of individual organization level dynamics that resist change.  The paper concludes 









Waste minimization, pollution prevention, product stewardship, corporate environmental 
reporting, green marketing. How do commonly accepted ideas and beliefs about corporate 
practice such as these form and diffuse throughout organizational populations? The question is 
important to organizational theorists and managers alike. A central concern for organizational 
scholars today is to understand field level processes by which "collective rationality" first 
emerges and then subsequently changes (DiMaggio, 1995). A central concern for managers is 
developing corporate strategy during periods of change, instability and uncertainty, when 
multiple interests have a stake in defining appropriate corporate action. In both cases, these 
periods of flux often involve the interests of diverse parties both inside and outside the 
organization. And the issues about which they are concerned are often social issues, such as 
environmental protection, health care, international relations, labor trends, and the global 
economy.  
Stern and Barley (1996) argue that organizational theorists should contribute their 
analyses to these kinds of contemporary social issues. They argue that most academic 
contributions to such issues presently come from the disciplines of economics and law. But, 
these disciplines focus narrowly on overly rational conceptions and coercive mechanisms for 
identifying and solving key issues of public concern. They neglect the systemic organizational 
contexts that establish parameters for individual choice and action. This paper is an answer to 
this call. It is a model building paper that offers contributions both for expanding institutional 
analysis and elaborating the genesis and diffusion of corporate environmental practice.  
Recently, critics of existing institutional research (Hirsch, 1997; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 
1997) have argued that institutional literature (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995) places 
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too much emphasis on the homogeneity of organizational populations and not on the processes 
that may or may not create this outcome. This preoccupation facilitates a popular misconception 
of the theory as embodying only stability and inertia as its central defining characteristics 
(DiMaggio, 1995; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). By focusing on these characteristics, the 
complexity of organizational action is removed from field level models. Unified or monolithic 
institutional forces are deemed to create isomorphic organizational responses (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). Recent studies surveying organizational action in the context of their 
environmental and institutional contexts (Holm, 1995; Kraatz & Zajak, 1996; Greenwood & 
Hinings, 1996; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997) underscore the need for more work and more 
complex models in this area. 
Similarly, much research into the relationship between organizations and the natural 
environment has focused mainly on the strategic actions of individual organizations (e.g. 
Lawrence & Morell, 1995; Shrivastava, 1995; Lober, 1996). For example, Hart advances a 
“theory of competitive advantage based upon the firm’s relationship to the natural environment” 
(1995: 986) and Porter & van der Linde argue that “companies must start to recognize the 
environment as a competitive opportunity” (1995: 114). But this article highlights the benefits of 
applying existent theories of organizational behavior towards understanding this phenomena. By 
applying institutional theory to explaining the evolving conceptions of environmental 
management, this article examines the cultural and institutional systems of which organizations 
are a part. It goes beyond assessments of individual action to ask questions about the 
fundamental sources of those actions. 
To extend our understanding of institutional processes as they mediate between the firm 
and the natural environment, this paper seeks to integrate organizational action into models of 
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field level dynamics by allowing more complexity in the framing of the institutional field and 
developing corresponding connections to organizational structure, culture and practice. By 
paying balanced attention to both the influence of the institutional environment and the role of 
organizational self-interests and active agency within that environment (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 
1988; DiMaggio, 1988; Perrow, 1985), this paper advances the argument that organizational 
action is not a strict reaction to the pressures dictated by the field. Conversely, organizational 
action is not defined autonomously without the influence of external bounds. Institutional and 
organizational dynamics are tightly linked (Thomas, Meyer, Ramirez & Boli, 1987; Bazerman & 
Hoffman, 1999). 
The notion of "collective rationality" is to be seen, not as an argument of strict 
environmental determinism, but rather a choice among a bounded set of legitimately available 
options. Differential field effects occur at both the institutional and organizational levels, 
directed by both the institutional channels through which field level influences impact 
organizational behavior and the organizational routines through which those influences are 
received, interpreted and acted upon. Institutional analyses answer questions about how social 
choices are shaped, mediated, and channeled. Organizational analyses answer questions about 
which social choices are chosen for action. As shown in figure 1, this paper will build this 
institutional model by making links between (1) the complex constituency of the institutional 
field, (2) the multiple institutional definitions of legitimate repertoires that result from that 
constituency, and (3) the corresponding cultural routines that become enacted within firms. It 
will elaborate this model through an empirical application to the domain of environmental 
protection that includes each of these levels of analysis. Finally, it will offer a discussion of the 
implications and future research to further test this model. 
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Insert figure 1 about here 
 
Theoretical Development:  
Organizational Dynamics in a Field Level Context 
Firms are not autonomous units, able to develop and implement strategy in isolation from 
the influence of the external environment. Institutional arrangements and social processes are 
central to the formulation of organizational action (Orru, Biggart & Hamilton, 1991). They 
bound the range of possibilities such that organizational action must correctly be seen as a choice 
among a set of legitimate repertoires determined by the group of organizations which comprise 
the firm’s institutional field (Scott, 1991). The field is a composite of constituents within the 
firm's external social, political and economic environments (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 
1995). But the field is not monolithic. Harrison White suggests we think of the social structure of 
the institutional field, not as some tidy atom or embracing world, but rather as a "mineralized 
goo, some amazing swirl of local nuclei and long strands of order among disorder" (1992: 127). 
This is hardly a useful construct for measurement, but it highlights the complexity and 
amorphous nature of the concept of the institutional field.  
The field constituency defines both how to view organizational issues and what the 
appropriate responses should be. But more than just a collection of influential organizations, the 
field should be thought of as the center of common channels of dialogue and discussion. The 
field forms around a central issue — such as the protection of the natural environment — 
whereby competing interests negotiate over issue interpretation (Hoffman, 1999). The process 
may more resemble institutional “war” (White, 1992) than isomorphic dialogue. As such, it is 
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important to distinguish between the organizational field and individual populations (or 
"occupational communities" as will be discussed later) within that field. In practice, the field is 
comprised of critical exchange partners, sources of funding, regulatory groups, professional and 
trade associations, special interest groups, the general public, and other sources of normative or 
cognitive influence which effect individual or organizational action (Scott, 1991). Within this 
collective of actors, concepts of corporate practice are formed, defined and subsequently 
redefined.  
The form of this influence is manifested in three levels of institutions: (1) regulative, (2) 
normative and (3) cognitive (Scott, 1995). Each level differs in the degree to which it is visible 
and ranges from the directly coercive to the taken-for-granted (Zucker, 1983). Yet, these three 
levels form a composite of institutional pressures (Hoffman & Ventresca, 1999) that create 
descriptions of reality for the organization; explanations of what is and what is not, what can be 
acted upon and what cannot. As the institutional field establishes new codes of conduct, the 
emergent institutions will reflect these evolving perceptions, both as a source of empowerment 
(defining what they ought to do) and as a source of control (limiting options for consideration) 
(Jepperson, 1991; Fligstein, 1992). Hirsch (1986) describes these evolving perceptions as 
cultural frames. For example, he described how the cultural framing of hostile takeovers 
evolved from the 1960s, where it was considered a "deviant practice" to the 1980s where it 
became institutionalized as an accepted practice with its own specialized language.  
As the field is comprised of sub-populations, each employing its own language and 
cultural frame for understanding the issue being debated within the field, the form of institutional 
pressure becomes equally diverse in its form and frame. The locus of these sub-populations is 
termed occupational communities - groups of constituencies that cut across organizations and 
 8 
share common language, perspectives and assumptions about the nature of business (Schein, 
1996). Occupational communities making environmental demands do so in the strategic 
language and perspective from which they reside. They redefine and transmit corporate norms 
and beliefs into terms, institutions and cultural frames that represent their interests and culture.  
At the organization level, the firm responds to these pressures through pre-existing 
channels of communication traditionally employed to engage these occupational communities 
and interpret and act upon their demands. The firm is a composite of core organizational 
responsibilities, each with (sub) cultural differences established in part by linkages to its own 
relevant constituency of the external environment. Thus, the organizational response is reflected 
in functional competencies and the cultural frames that are embedded within each. Culture 
shapes individual consciousness throughout the organization, imposing routines that reflect 
socially approved, purposive action (Jackall, 1988). It guides the perception and behavior of all 
members as it develops over history and is formed around critical incidents and organizational 
responses (Schein, 1992). It is embedded and perpetuated by organization-level systems that lie 
on three levels: (1) artifacts, (2) espoused values, and (3) basic underlying beliefs (Schein, 1990, 
1992). Each level differs in the degree to which cultural phenomena are visible and ranges from 
the very tangible, overt manifestations that one can see and feel to the deeply embedded, 
unconscious basic assumptions that form the essence of culture (Schein, 1992). Yet, together 
they form the composite for how constituents within the organization perceive and make sense of 
changes within the external and internal environments. 
In sum, the model presented in this paper ties the level of the field with the level of the 
organization through cultural frames that lie within the communication channels of the firm's 
occupational communities. The form of organizational response is as much a reflection of the 
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institutional pressures that emerge from outside the organization, as it is the form of 
organizational structure and culture that exists inside the organization. At this interface lies a 
fundamental inter-relationship between institutional and cultural forms (Bazerman & Hoffman, 
1999). More explicitly, the three levels of institutions - regulative, normative and cognitive 
(Scott, 1995) - can be seen as having direct parallels to the three levels of culture - artifacts, 
espoused values, and basic underlying beliefs (Schein, 1990, 1992). The deepest level in both 
domains represent beliefs about appropriate action that are taken-for-granted and perceived as 
non-negotiable. It is the most difficult level of culture and institutions for the researcher to detect 
and for the organizational or field members to articulate. Underlying cultural beliefs create 
"behavioral, emotional, and cognitive elements of the group members’ total psychological 
functioning” (Schein, 1992: 10). Cognitive institutions guide our understanding of the nature of 
reality and the frames through which that meaning is developed. Both form a culturally 
supported and conceptually correct basis of legitimacy which becomes unquestioned.  
The importance of this linkage is that the essence of organizational culture and the 
essence of institutions are described on the very same terms. The connections between them 
become an important component of any model of organizational change and can be seen in the 
taken for granted structures. Basic underlying beliefs of organizational culture and cognitive 
institutions each represent common concepts of unquestioned beliefs that perpetuate behavior 
without the knowledge of the actor, thus making them difficult to uncover. They can be shared 
from one organization to the next through organizational communities, as described in the 
cultural literature or through institutional fields as described in the institutional literature. 
Further, given their institutional and cultural linkages, organizational behaviors affect what 
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becomes institutionalized and visa versa. The two must be seen as interconnected and recursive. 
Social structure is both the mediator and the outcome of organizational practice (Giddens, 1979). 
 
Field Level Dynamics and Corporate Environmental Practice  
Why do firms incorporate concerns for environmental protection into corporate practice? 
The answer has both institutional and cultural components. It requires an understanding of who 
within the field is driving that concern, what cultural framing of the issue results and how the 
organization enacts that frame and invokes a response (Hoffman & Ventresca, 2001). We must 
understand both external and internal dynamics to create a complete model for understanding the 
formation and diffusion of commonly accepted ideas and beliefs about organizational practice. 
We must look to certain organizations within the institutional environment that possess the 
power and capability to influence or establish the rules and norms of corporate behavior 
(Fligstein, 1991). Governments are the most prominent (and the most studied in both institutional 
and environmental analyses), able to establish laws which bind organizations to certain practices 
and procedures. Similarly, many empirical analyses look to social activists as lying at the center 
of social movements such as environmentalism (Olson, 1965; Zald & McCarthy, 1987). Neither 
is monolithic, but in fact represent two occupational communities which have been the most 
visible drivers of corporate environmental practice. As a result, the two traditional cultural 
frames of corporate environmental practice represent their respective interests: regulatory 
compliance and social responsibility.  
In the frame of "regulatory compliance," the relationship between corporate practice and 
environmental protection becomes institutionally defined in terms of how environmentalism acts 
as a regulatory constraint. Through this lens, environmental protection is lamented as a useful 
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social endeavor but a decidedly unproductive intrusion into corporate affairs (Walley & 
Whitehead, 1994). It is a restriction on or deviation from the central corporate activities. 
Environmental problems are treated as an economic “externality” or market failure (Cropper & 
Oates, 1992) and solutions must be artificially introduced through regulation. Responsibility is 
delegated to a regulatory affairs function with a focus on what companies “must” do to remain 
legal members of the community.  
In the frame of "social responsibility," the relationship between corporate practice and 
environmental protection becomes institutionally defined in terms of the impact of that practice 
on environmental ecosystems. In this format, social activists call field level attention to the 
environmental damages of industrial activity, pointing out that US industry releases up to four 
billion pounds of hazardous or toxic chemicals each year (to the air, water or land) (US 
Environmental Protection Agency, 1992) and contributes to increasing problems of greenhouse 
gas buildup, ozone depletion, and air and water pollution. Faced with such a cultural frame, 
corporations delegate responsibilities to a public affairs function with a focus on what 
corporations “should” do to offset these transgressions and remain legitimate members of 
society. 
In both cases, corporations will be expected to do little to protect the environment unless 
the government forces them or activists shame them. Institutional pressures are coercive in 
nature, driven by the threat of either legal sanction (civil, administrative and criminal penalties) 
or social sanction (protests, negative press, diminished reputation and image). The environmental 
issue becomes institutionally defined as external to business interests, a threat or an unwanted 
restraint on corporate affairs from sources separate from the key drivers of the market system. 
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Corporate environmental practice is then predicated on buffering the operating core and 
managing these constraints on corporate objectives.  
But more recently, the field level drivers of environmental protection have become more 
complex, creating more diverse cultural frames than merely regulatory compliance or social 
responsibility. Environmental concerns are now originating from occupational communities such 
as academic institutions, trade associations, competitors, banks, insurance companies, investors, 
religious organizations, local communities and the press, each of which are altering the 
definitions of legitimate corporate environmental practice (Hoffman, 2000). Through a complex 
web of constituents, environmental protection is becoming culturally reframed from something 
external to the market environment to something that is central to the core objectives of the firm. 
This triggers a more complex set of strategic responses than have been traditionally invoked. As 
such, organizations must devote resources towards environmental initiatives in a way that 
simultaneously satisfies their economic objectives. Rather than denying or lamenting 
environmental pressures, organizations are now considering how environmentalism and business 
strategy can be mutually developed (Porter & Van der Linde, 1995; Miller, 1998). By looking to 
the expanding field of environmental pressures, we can see how the issue is being institutionally 
redefined, culturally reframed and organizationally acted upon. 
 
Field-Level Drivers of Corporate Environmental Practice. 
Field level drivers of corporate environmental practice have been studied within the 
context of inter-organizational relationships (Starik & Rands, 1995; Clarke & Roome, 1999) and 
stakeholder management (Berman, Wicks, Kotha & Jones, 1999; Clarkson, 1995). Many of these 
studies have individually identified organizations such as government, trade associations, 
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financial institutions, accounting professions, suppliers, partners, NGOs and employees as being 
critical in this process. But, few studies to date have empirically collected a composite analysis 
of this field level effect. By building upon and linking the individual analyses that exist, the 
foundation of this composite can be constructed and built upon. 
For example, government action cannot be seen as an isolated force within the field. 
Their action is often the product of pressures from within the field. In a survey of Fortune 500 
CEOs in 1995, Andrews (1998) found that coercive legal requirements and public perceptions 
were most important in driving environmental business strategy. But he also found that scientific 
evidence, shareholder expectations, customer requirements, industry norms, employee 
suggestions and supplier actions were also influential (in decreasing order). Using network 
analysis, Andrews considered how the government itself was an actor within the field, being 
influenced by these field level constituencies. Consistent within this theme, O'Leary (1991) 
studied how individual citizens, through citizen suit provisions of EPA statutes, were able to alter 
the policies and administration of the agency in the 1980s. Protess et al, (1987) found evidence 
of policy agenda-setting effects from media coverage of toxic waste issues. Pizzolatto and 
Zeringue (1993) studied the links between the passage of laws to protect the environment, 
consumer interest in environmental issues and corporate actions that seek to satisfy both. These 
linkages were found to be dual directional, with corporate action seen as both the cause and 
effect of external pressures. Each of these studies support the argument towards a field level 
analysis of environmental protection with the government as one part of the network both 
influencing and being influenced by constituents in the field. 
These constituents can also impact corporate activity directly. Many existing studies have 
identified these pressures and their importance. In studying recycling initiatives, Jennings and 
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Zandbergen (1995) identified the constituency of the organizational field in terms of local 
organizations involved in the process, such as paper producers, paper purchasers, paper 
recyclers, governments and consumers. Lawrence and Morell (1995) studied eight manufacturing 
firms in Santa Clara County, California and found that firms were driven by regulations, 
followed by cost factors and pressure from stakeholders such as environmental NGOs and 
shareholders. Clemens and Douglas (2001) observed that the drivers of corporate environmental 
action in the steel industry were international agreements, federal and state agencies, consumers 
and industry standards (e.g. ISO14000). Dupuy (1997) studied the development of pollution 
control technologies in the Province of Ontario and found that, while government regulation was 
a critical motivator of technological development, the influence of suppliers and users of that 
technology were also strong. And finally, several studies have highlighted the field level 
dynamics by which environmental standards transfer across international boundaries. Anwar 
(1999) and Sorstrom (1999) studied the linkages among multi-national firms, international 
government agencies and environmental practices within China. Liverman, Varady, Chavez and 
Sanchez (1999) studied environmental management along the US-Mexico border and found that 
bi-national agreements were particularly important but also important were the actions of 
environmental NGOs in gaining their acceptance.  
Each of these studies highlights the interconnections among field level constituencies. To 
create a structured model of the categories of occupational communities influencing corporate 
environmental practice, one must consider each constituency that has a direct impact on business 
practice, norms and beliefs. Nine occupational communities will be considered here: suppliers 
and buyers, consumers, financial institutions, shareholders, investors, insurance underwriters, 
trade associations, academic institutions and religious institutions. 
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The environmental impact of a product is the sum of the impacts of each input and output 
from suppliers and buyers in the value-chain (Goodman, 1998). Companies become tied to one 
another. If one company introduces a toxic material into the process, all companies must now 
consider how it should be handled. Further, if a company towards the end of the value chain is 
receiving a signal from end-users that the product is environmentally destructive, they must 
impose restrictions on their suppliers in order to remove it. Some companies, such as Nike and 
Proctor & Gamble, are considering the implications of the actions of other organizations up and 
down the value chain in the impact of their environmental activities (Smart, 1992; Jablonksi, 
1994; Katz & Sharp, 1994). Similarly, some consumers are willing to make the connection 
between environmental performance and their buying decisions. SC Johnson & Sons conducted a 
study that found that this class of “green” consumers made up at least 25 percent of the 
population in 1993 and was growing (SC Johnson/Roper, 1993).  
One important component of the supply chain is capital and some financial institutions 
are beginning to look at the environmental practices of the applicant, equating poor 
environmental performance with high financial risk. The European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) has written into its establishing agreement that it will “promote in the full 
range of its activities environmentally sound and sustainable development” (EBRD, 1991). In 
April 1995, the government of Brazil required all banks and credit institutions to grant loans only 
to projects that take environmental impacts into consideration. In 1992, the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP) coordinated a declaration of environmental commitment of the 
banking industry with signatories committing to incorporate environmental factors into their 
daily business practices (Schmidhieny, 1996). In a survey of European banks, 15 participants 
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said they offered discounted rates for environmentally responsible companies, shaving as much 
as 50 basis points from the rate and halving the fees (Monroe, 1999).  
Another source of capital, shareholders have exerted environmental pressure on 
corporations since 1989. The Council for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) 
was the first to enlist investors to file environmental proxy resolutions in annual board meetings 
and seek the endorsement of its environmental principles. More recently, the environmental 
community has begun to engage this constituency. According to Julie Tanner, senior financial 
analyst at the National Wildlife Federation, “We have been training people all around the world 
about the role of financial institutions and where they can find points of leverage” (Monroe, 
1999). Even without such outside influence, some shareholders have taken it upon themselves to 
exert environmental pressures on the companies in whom they own stock. The Maxxam 
Corporation and Occidental Petroleum Company have recently been targets (Waldman, 1999; 
Nieves, 1999). 
Beyond banks and shareholders, broad-based investors are also an important source of 
capital. And like banks and shareholders, they are beginning to equate environmental 
performance with good management. Some studies have found a positive correlation between 
environmental and economic performance. The Alliance for Environmental Innovation reviewed 
70 research studies and concluded that companies that outperform their peers environmentally 
also outperform them on the stock market by as much as 2 percentage points. ICF Kaiser found a 
similar correlation in a study of 300 of the largest public companies in the US (Feldman, Soyka 
& Ameer, 1996). With this correlation as a trigger, some funds are buying stocks that represent 
“best of class” in basic industries like paper and steel. These companies, according to fund 
managers, handle their environmental affairs responsibly relative to their industry competitors 
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and will likely manage their overall operations more responsibly. This type of screening has, for 
some, lead to greater returns (Bailey & Syre, 1998; Deutsch, 1998; Aspen Institute, 1998). In 
1998, the New York Society of Security Analysts — the largest and most influential society of 
investment professionals in the world — launched Uncovering Value, a series of environmental 
seminars to examine how progressive corporate environmental practices contribute to a 
company’s performance, profitability and growth (Descano & Gentry, 1998).  
Insurance underwriters are beginning to see environmentally risky operations as being 
correlated with increased financial risk and are beginning to apply environmental criteria for 
minimizing that risk in their underwriting practices (Leggett, 1996; Schmidheiny, 1996). In this 
way, they are demanding sound environmental practices before a policy is written. In November 
1995, the industry developed a UNEP-supported Statement of Environmental Commitment with 
78 official signatories making commitments to include the environment as one of the value-
drivers in their under-writing decisions (Frankel, 1996). 
Trade associations are making environmental demands on their constituent members. 
Beginning in 1989 with the Chemical Manufacturer's Association (CMA) Responsible Care 
Program, similarly designed programs have flourished in other industries such as petroleum, 
printing, textiles, paper, lead, and automobiles.  
Finally, shifting norms on the appropriate role of the corporation in interacting with the 
environment are taking place within the institutions of several fundamental social arenas. First, 
academic institutions are teaching students about the environment in ways that are far different 
than that of previous generations (Dembner, 1994). Not only students in grades K-12 (National 
Science and Technology Council, 1994), but also students at the university level are being 
offered a growing number of environmental courses in business, engineering, science, 
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journalism, law and public policy schools (Makower, 1993; Mangan, 1994; Pham, 1994; 
Wagner, 1994; Friedman, 1996; Finlay, Bunch & Neubert, 1998). Also, many of the world’s 
religious institutions are changing their view of the morality of behavior towards the 
environment. The Presbyterian Church decided to place environmental concerns directly into the 
church canon, thus making it a sin to “threaten death to the planet entrusted to our care” 
(Associated Press, 1991: 4). The Roman Catholic Church equated environmental degradation 
with theft from future generations in its new catechism (Woodward & Nordland, 1992). His All 
Holiness Bartholomew I, spiritual leader of the world’s 300 million Orthodox Christians, equated 
specific ecological problems with sinful behavior (Stammer, 1997). 
All of these pressures add up to a collectively different set of field level pressures than 
what corporate decision-makers faced in the past. The notion that environmental pressures 
emerge from a monolithic institutional field is inaccurate. These pressures, in fact, emerge from 
many diverse sets of interests as depicted in figure 2. 
 
Insert figure 2 about here 
 
The Cultural Framing of Corporate Environmental Practice 
Out of this evolving field of constituents comes an evolving set of definitions for 
environmental issues, social issues and legitimate corporate practice. This field exists in dynamic 
form (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Hoffman, 1999) such that the cultural framing of 
environmental protection has been evolving steadily over the past decades. What was called 
ecology in the late 1960s has evolved successively into environmental management, waste 
minimization, pollution prevention, product stewardship, total quality environmental 
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management, eco-efficiency, industrial ecology and environmental strategy. To understand this 
evolution, we must connect the cultural framing of environmental protection to the specific 
interests presented by each field-level source. As the pressures on the organization emerge from 
each institutional constituency, it becomes redefined and transformed. Each field level 
constituent employs a different set of institutions and cultural artifacts in articulating what 
environmental protection means.  
For example, insurance company under-writing practices act as consulting 
recommendations, influencing how companies handle their environmental affairs. If companies 
choose not to adopt insurance recommended practices, they will find their business costs raised 
through higher premiums. And indirectly, insurance companies possess large amounts of 
investment capital from premiums, which can be used to sway financial markets (Schmidheiny, 
1996). So, when environmental pressures are imposed on the corporation from insurance 
companies, environmentalism becomes translated into an issue of risk management and capital 
acquisition, two issues of central importance to corporate practice.  
Similarly, when buyers and suppliers impose environmental pressures on the firm, they 
become framed as an issue of operational efficiency through resource acquisition, processing and 
sale. When imposed by banks, shareholders and investors, they become framed as an issue of 
capital acquisition. When consumers begin to consider environmental concerns in their 
purchasing decisions, the issue becomes framed as an issue of market demand. When 
competitors begin to use the environment as a strategic issue or challenge how others use it, the 
issue becomes translated into one of competitive strategy. When trade associations see 
opportunities in presenting a unified front on environmental affairs, the issue becomes one of 
industry reputation or external and government relations. And when academic and religious 
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institutions begin to impose environmental concerns, the issue becomes framed as one of human 
resource management regarding personal values and corporate culture.  
By tying environmental concerns to the institutional constituents driving it, 
environmental protection becomes less an environmental issue, framed instead in terms that 
reflect the cultural interests, beliefs and perspectives of its occupational community source. 
Moving beyond regulatory compliance and social responsibility, these forms can be collapsed 
into six basic frames employed by business groups to justify corporate environmental practice 
(Aspen Institute, 1998; GEMI, 1999) as shown in figure 3. 
 
Insert figure 3 about here 
 
Environmental Protection as Operational Efficiency. In this cultural frame, 
environmental protection is redefined as a tool for finding new ways to optimize operations. The 
central tenets are eco-efficiency, waste-minimization and pollution prevention. By reducing the 
input of total or hazardous materials or by minimizing the output of wastes, some argue that it is 
possible to lower the costs of production (Porter & van der Linde, 1995). First, through process 
optimization, material yield and resource utilization rates may be increased thereby reducing 
costs per unit of product produced. Second, minimizing wastes, emissions and discharges can 
lower regulatory compliance, engineering, control management and disposal costs.  Further, it 
can reduce liability costs from potential spills and health and safety exposures which can 
translate into lower insurance premiums and lower threat of worker injury lawsuits. And finally, 
integrating concerns for pollution prevention into engineering design criteria can often expose 
previously unseen opportunities for streamlining or eliminating process components and 
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maintenance procedures. Through this framing, environmental practices are argued to result in 
strategic improvements by reassessing taken-for-granted practices, rules of thumb and protocols.  
Environmental Protection as Risk Management. In this cultural frame, environmental 
protection is redefined as an opportunity to reduce costs associated with environmental risks. 
First, limiting environmental exposures to employees, contractors, and customers can directly 
lower corporate insurance premiums. Second, environmental risk management strategies may 
reduce the need and associated costs of contingent emergency procedures in both the short and 
the long term. In the short-term, portions of emergency preparedness programs may be rendered 
obsolete after hazards are eliminated. For the long-term, pro-active measures and effective plans 
may reduce the costs of emergency response and clean-up, as well as the associated regulatory 
penalties and legal expenses. And finally, as product stewardship concerns become more 
pervasive, incorporating environmental considerations into initial product design programs may 
reduce the potential for ongoing liabilities associated with product use, misuse, and disposal. 
Through this framing, environmental protection programs are argued to result in strategic 
improvements by reducing liability exposure and waste disposal liability risks.  
Environmental Protection as Capital Acquisition. In this configuration, environmental 
protection is framed as an opportunity to reduce costs of capital investments in new sites, facility 
construction, and the start-up or redesign of manufacturing lines and new products. First, 
integrating environmental considerations into the capital acquisition and change processes may 
reduce the uncertainty of corporate transactions. Environmental due diligence activities may 
uncover hidden environmental liabilities in property acquisitions and divestitures. Brownfield 
redevelopment, for example, may bring strategic business and tax advantages if one translates 
the environmental hazards into strategic opportunities. Second, intervening in capital projects 
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early to secure permits, address regulatory requirements and foresee environmental problems 
may streamline new product development or facility expansion. Attention to environmental 
protection and community relations, for example, can play a key role in overcoming community 
opposition to new plant construction or facility expansion. And third, companies may reduce the 
overall operating expenses of new facilities by incorporating environmental considerations into 
the initial design. Since plant upgrades in response to increasing environmental pressures cost 
more than at initial process design, overall operating costs will be reduced. Through this framing, 
environmental protection programs are argued to result in strategic improvements through 
lowered the cost of capital, reduced utility and maintenance costs, and improved working 
productivity. 
Environmental Protection as Market Demand. As market demand, environmental 
protection is framed as an opportunity to enhance the market share for products and services by 
appealing to both end-use customers or buyers and up-front suppliers or vendors. First, 
companies may appeal to environmentally conscious consumers by increasing recycled or 
recyclable material use, reducing virgin material use, eliminating hazardous product constituents, 
and decreasing the environmental impact of their products. Such green marketing efforts may 
enhance the company's public image and the marketability of its brand name. In many industries, 
environmental performance has become a lightening rod for public inquiry and consumer 
decision-making. Reputational effects from environmental problems circulate though the press 
and other channels, influencing consumer preferences, spurring boycotts, and in some cases 
affecting bottom line sales (such as the Boycotts imposed upon Shell during the Brent Spar 
disposal debate). Second, high environmental performance standards may also appeal to 
suppliers and buyers who may be seeking strategic advantage through their own environmental 
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initiatives. Through this framing, environmental programs are argued to enhance public 
perceptions of a company and improve the marketability of its products and services. They are 
also argued to help secure beneficial supplier relationships and win supply contracts with new 
companies. Environmental considerations become one aspect of the value offered by a company. 
Environmental Protection as Strategic Direction. In this cultural frame, environmental 
protection is argued to expose important information and insights for guiding new strategic 
directions. This can manifest itself in a number of ways. First, by measuring environmental costs 
and risks associated with product or process lines, companies can identify strategic opportunities 
in redirecting attention and resources towards less risky and more attractive alternatives. Second, 
by remaining alert to changes in consumer preference, media attention, community concerns and 
regulatory program trends, companies can exit increasingly risky business areas in favor of more 
secure options. Third, by attending to these trends, companies can also exert greater control over 
their image, reputation and ultimately, financial performance by shifting organizational resources 
when needed. And finally, as markets and industries rapidly change, corporate environmental 
attributes and performance may help secure new markets and protect existing ones from external 
criticism, protest and attack. For example, a management team which is alert to environmental 
issues and publishes their results through corporate environmental reports may find that investors 
or insurance companies will be more steadfast in times of tension or crisis.  Through this 
framing, environmental protection programs are argued to create strategic opportunities through 
enhanced innovation and capitalization on both existing and emerging market demand.  
Environmental Protection as Human Resource Management. Finally, improved 
environmental performance is framed as an opportunity to increase workplace productivity.  
First, a strong environmental reputation as well as environmentally safe working conditions can 
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help companies attract higher caliber applicants.  This is particularly valuable as labor markets 
shrink.  Second, leading environmental performer may improve their ability to retain such 
workers.  This reduces the costs of recruiting and training for new employees.  Third, improved 
working conditions can increase worker productivity and process output. For example, improved 
indoor air quality, reduced noise levels and energy-efficient lighting upgrades have been argued 
to reduce absenteeism and improve staff morale and productivity. Through this frame, 
environmental protection programs are argued to increase competitiveness through 
improvements in staff commitment to the company and to the task.  
In sum, the issue of environmental protection is actually a composite of many cultural 
frames. The issue has traditionally been framed as regulatory compliance and social 
responsibility, but is now being framed in a variety of ways. Each of these frames is the product 
of the filtering of the issue through specific occupational communities that interact with business 
constituents. It is this level of framing that connects field level dynamics with organization level 
culture, structure and practice. 
 
Organizational Responses to Field-Level Pressures 
Organizationally, the scientific validity of certain environmental issues is of less 
importance than the channels through which those issues are received. Powerful constituents 
within the institutional field translate environmental practice through the business channels of 
their occupational community. Organizations then enact a cultural and structural response that 
reflects their institutional source. Evolving institutional pressures for environmental protection 
make demands for concurrent and supporting shifts in organizational culture, structure, reward 
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systems, and job responsibilities. Organizations interpret these pressures and develop an 
organizational response that is consistent with the interests of these institutional constituencies.  
At times, the field level pressures for this organizational consistency are coercive and 
clear. In 1993, for example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) mandated 
organizational changes as part of an enforcement action against the United Technologies 
Corporation (UTC). The EPA fined UTC $5,301,910 for violations of federal and state 
hazardous waste and water pollution control laws. As part of the settlement, UTC was required 
to: (1) implement an extensive multi-media environmental audit of all 26 of its New England 
facilities and (2) hire a management consultant to make management improvement 
recommendations for achieving compliance with every major environmental law at all of its 
facilities. According to an EPA press release, “this is one of the most extensive environmental 
audits ever agreed to in an enforcement action ... by this settlement we have not only corrected 
past problems, but have also acted to assure future violations will be deterred” (Hoffman, 1997: 
9). 
But, where such pressures are not so clear, greater understanding of the linkages between 
the field and the firm lies in understanding that external constituencies redefine the 
environmental protection issue into terms that reflect their own interests - terms with which the 
corporation may already be familiar. In the case of each constituency, the firm has pre-existing 
models and language within its individual functions and competencies with which to 
conceptualize and formulate a response. By realizing this “fit,” firms frame environmental issues 
as related to core business concerns. An efficient organizational response to institutional 
pressures involves the direction of environmental pressures to the functional levels best equipped 
to handle them given their culturally framed form, as shown in figure 4. Through the channels of 
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the firm's occupational communities, environmental issues diffuse from the periphery of 
specialized environmental health and safety departments to the core of the organization’s 
functional competencies. Through this process, it transforms the work roles and functions of the 
various departments within the organization. 
 
Insert figure 4 about here 
 
Organizational Resistance to Field Level Change 
By incorporating organizations into field-level analysis, we can begin to identify new 
sources of resistance to change. Where fields are traditionally regarded as embodying stability 
and inertia, this model allows for the possibility that resistance to change can originate at the 
organizational level. Through structural inertia and cultural barriers, organizations can resist 
enacting new cultural frames of environmental protection as directed by the institutional field. 
Change requires that organizations break down traditional structures and beliefs that have 
become institutionalized over decades. For example, since the establishment of environmental 
regulations in 1970, most corporations have adopted a government-centered approach to 
handling environmental issues through a segmented division of responsibilities within the 
organization. Environmental affairs departments were developed as organizationally specialized 
functions whose objectives were to ensure that the corporation remained in compliance with 
environmental demands so that the operating core could remain focused on maximizing profits, 
buffered from external interference. But, such structural arrangements create communication 
breakdowns throughout the organization.  
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A survey by Arthur D. Little identified a lack of integration among departments as one of 
the major roadblocks to the effective management of corporate environmental issues (Shelton & 
Shopley, 1995). Departments within the same organization often could not communicate their 
interests or opportunities to one another. Beyond structural limitations to free flows of 
information, the language, rhetoric, objectives and external constituency of the various 
departments limit the identification of strategically important environmental actions. For 
example, the environmental management staff often takes for granted that the value of their 
strategic environmental programs is apparent. So, they fail to adopt the business metrics and 
lexicon that are employed by other parts of the organization in communicating that value, such as 
return on investment (ROI) and earnings per share (EPS). Instead, environmental managers often 
use non-business acronyms such as pounds of toxics, biological oxygen demand (BOD), notice 
of deficiency (NOD), environmental impact statement (EIS), and life cycle assessment (LCA), 
which may be familiar to their external constituency but serve to distance other business 
managers from environmental matters (Shelton & Shopley, 1995).  
Institutionalized routines can also inhibit change. In accounting balance sheets, for 
example, environmental protection costs are generally listed as a liability and not an asset, even 
if expenditures result in decreased compliance and disposal costs, savings in other areas such as 
improved public relations, or liability and regulatory reduction. Thus, departmental managers are 
often shielded from incentives to seek more efficient solutions to environmental problems as 
environmental costs are billed, not to the department, but to corporate overhead (Treasury 
Managers Report, 1996). For example, most corporations pay for energy costs out of overhead 
expenses. So, while small incremental reductions can yield large company wide paybacks, most 
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firms overlook them as individual departments remain unaware of their economic impacts and 
focus instead on investments that increase output or market share (Brown & Levine, 1997). 
A collaborative case study between Dow Chemical and the Natural Resources Defense 
Council found that organizational breakdowns were the primary inhibitor of the adoption of 
pollution prevention initiatives at one Dow facility, despite the projection that the company could 
possibly save more than $1 million a year by eliminating 500,000 pounds of waste. Since the 
program was not required for the purposes of environmental compliance, it was not of central 
interest to production engineers whose main priorities were capacity building. And since it did 
not appeal to business line personnel with profit-and-loss authority, the project was not 
implemented. These staff personnel were more interested in maximizing profit for their business 
through yield improvements rather than waste minimization (Greer & Van Loben Sels, 1997). 
Organizational change will involve the unlearning of what has been ingrained over the 
organization's history. And this will often invite resistance. Basic assumptions about 
organizational procedures and the realities of the external environment can become rigidly set 
and are difficult to reset. At times, this rigidity can be positive, allowing the organization to react 
rapidly to changes in the environment that fall within the range of issues previously encountered. 
But it can also operate as a pattern of thought and action, which can limit possibilities for 
creative action. While the institutional field can evolve and allow greater flexibility in the 
repertoire of legitimate organizational action, the inability of the organization to respond may be 
the source of inertia and resistance to change. Isomorphism may then be the result of 




Implications for Institutional Analyses  
The model presented in this paper draws important insights for the study of institutions 
and their influence on corporate environmental behavior. It addresses two critical weaknesses in 
the existing literature. First, much of institutional analyses treat the institutional field and its 
influence on organizational action as monolithic. For example, Fligstein (1990) attributed the 
changing power-base within American firms (from manufacturing to sales to finance) to power 
shifts created by institutional pressures from government regulation. Similarly, DiMaggio (1991) 
observed the institutionalization of the form of American Art Museums as the product of 
institutional pressures from trade associations and funding agencies. In each of these cases, the 
dominant constituency of the field, the form of institutional pressure and the repertoire of 
organizational response was principally monolithic, originating from one or two organizations 
and yielding one organizational form. Hoffman (1999) introduced a more complex notion of a 
field moving through stages in which the constituency grew in number and interaction patterns. 
Yet, this study still presented the form of institutional pressure as monolithic, leading the 
subsequent industry response towards isomorphism, a homogenous field wide response.  
This paper suggests that fields cannot be conceived in such singularly clean and orderly 
terms. The field must be seen as, in fact, a highly complex collective of constituents whose 
composite influence on corporate behavior is varied and diverse. More than arguing that the firm 
exists within multiple organizational fields (Lounsbury, 1996), this paper argues that this 
multiplicity is part of the same field. Thus, the institutions that define legitimate corporate 
practice, while centered on common beliefs, are equally diverse and complex. It presents a 
notion of the field as a highly diverse collective of actors whose composite influence on 
corporate behavior is varied and complex. Thus, the institutions that define legitimate corporate 
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practice are equally varied and complex. Differential effects occur at the organizational level and 
the institutional channels through which field level influences impact organizational behavior.  
Second, few institutional analyses fully connect the influence of institutional fields to 
culture and practice on the organizational level. Most research analyzes the phenomena in terms 
of field level change, not individual response. This leaves the theory disembodied and over-
socialized. It describes the recipients of field influence as an homogenous collection of 
organizational actors, each behaving according to a social script designed by the social 
environment (Granovetter, 1985). This paper argues that the influence of the institutional field is 
varied within each organizational context. To understand firm heterogeneity within an 
institutional context, field level analysis is only half of the equation. Organization level analysis 
must be included. Some have attempted to bridge this gap, arguing that firms can respond 
strategically to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991) or that individual actors may strategically 
influence the process of institutional change becoming what might be called “institutional 
entrepreneurs” (Fligstein, 1997; Lawrence, 1999). But, in these cases, the organization and the 
field are treated as separate and distinct. The firm "responds" to institutional pressures rather than 
acting within the bounds they create.  
This paper presents institutional pressures as a collective of cultural repertoires that 
bound possibilities for organizational structure, culture and action. Yet, the individual 
organization is still capable of choosing among this repertoire. This paper connects the influence 
of institutions at the field level to the resultant culture and practice at the organizational level. 
Institutional pressures are viewed as a collective of cultural repertoires that bound organizational 
structure, culture and action. Through cultural influences, action becomes a choice among a 
bounded set of legitimately available options and not a choice among an unlimited array of 
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possibilities. Linking figures 2, 3 and 4, we can model the interconnections among the field level 
constituency driving environmental issues, the cultural frames employed by each and the 
organizational response that is triggered by these varying constituencies. 
By connecting institutional and organizational level analyses, new and more complex 
models of change can explain the genesis and alteration of legitimate corporate practice. One 
important point that emerges is the notion of institutions as a source for change while 
organizational inertia can be seen as a source of resistance to that change. This is a dramatic shift 
from traditional views. The institutional literature has often been criticized for its failure to 
adequately address the concept of change (DiMaggio, 1988; Brint & Karabel, 1991; Hirsch & 
Lounsbury, 1997; Hirsch, 1997). Traditionally, institutions are seen as powerful pressures for 
organizations to seek legitimacy and strive for social conformity (Orru, Biggart & Hamilton, 
1991) thereby resulting in an increasing homogeneity of organizations (Kraatz & Zajac, 1996).  
The objectives of future work are to construct a field based view of the drivers of 
corporate organizational thought and action; elaborate the linkages between organizational and 
institutional phenomena, and; seek to explain under what circumstances change occurs at the 
level of the organization in defiance of institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991). Conversely, future 
work should also assess under what circumstances change occurs at the level of the institutional 
field while resistance lies at the level of the organization. Such models must include 
considerations for both institutional and cultural dynamics.  
 
Implications for Environmental Analyses 
This paper elevates environmental analysis to the level of the field and its relation to 
organizational practice. It depicts how individual strategic action is only possible within the 
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range of available options defined by the organizational field. As the field evolves, so does that 
range of options. It treats institutions and organizations as the relevant level of analysis for these 
types of issues. For, while technological and economic activity may be proximate factors in 
environmentally destructive behavior, this paper focuses on the sources and structure of 
collective rationality, framing processes, and social and political institutions that embed those 
technical and economic factors (Bazerman & Hoffman, 1999; Dacin, Beal, & Ventresca; 1999; 
Hirsch, 1986). Further analytical study and public policy recommendations can benefit from an 
adjusted level of analysis that considers social and cultural sources of habitual action and social 
change.  
The linkage between institutional constituencies and cultural perceptions of the 
environment is not entirely new. Rannikko (1996) examined the change in environmental 
consciousness in Finland by examining the structural and attitudinal background of 
environmental conflicts, in particular the struggle over construction of tourist facilities and 
conservation of the wilderness on the mountain of Koli. By analyzing the varying cultural bases 
and motives of various populations, he concluded that it is important to study those social actors 
who participate in the defining of environmental problems. Similarly, in developing criteria for 
evaluating an organization's environmental performance, Lober (1996) identified the importance 
of relationships with external groups such as communities, shareholders, suppliers and 
consumers, the media, environmental groups and the government. However, rather than viewing 
these relationships as sources of pressure from the external environment, he analyzed them as 
stakeholders who are affected by corporate action. 
A focus on the field, institutions and collective rationality yields insights about how 
social perception and enactment of environmental issues takes place and, therefore, highlights 
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the fundamental sources of organizational action as a response. This can allow us to go beyond 
assessments of strict individual action to understanding how conceptions of environmental issues 
are created and how those conceptions result in individual and organizational action which may 
conflict with environmental interests (Bazerman and Hoffman 1999; Clark and Jennings 1997). 
In particular, institutional and organizational analysis seeks to understand how ideas and beliefs 
about organizational strategies and practice become standard and spread in highly structured 
fields of activity (Edelman, 1990). Further, it focuses on the dynamics by which these structures 
shift, create new realities for organizations and redefine the basic resource context. Collective 
notions of what is appropriate corporate behavior emerge and evolve through field-level debate.  
 
Research Directions 
In its most simple and basic terms, future research should analyze and measure the 
presence, scale and meaning of the individual wedges in figures 2, 3 and 4 and then analyze the 
connections among them. More specifically, the empirical task of testing institutional and 
organizational linkages will be to measure the diversity of both the institutions driving 
environmental pressures within a collective of companies and the corresponding organizational 
responses developed within each company. Unfortunately, deep level analysis on each level 
typically employs different and, to some degree, mutually exclusive methodologies. Deep 
analysis of organizational culture typically requires in-depth ethnography of a single case study 
(Van Maanen, 1988; Schein, 1992). Deep analysis on the institutional level typically seeks to 
identify patterns among a large sample of organizations (Fligstein, 1990). A hybrid research 
strategy that straddles both domains must include a large sample inherent in institutional 
analyses, but include in-depth organization level perspectives inherent in cultural analyses. One 
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component of such a study could involve a survey analysis of a large size sample for 
generalization across large populations of the field.  
Data collection could focus on a sample of firms that are facing similar institutional 
pressures. A survey could ask questions of managers among multiple departments to determine 
what drives environmental protection concerns and in what form they are framed, conceived and 
acted upon. In all survey analyses, however, answers must be tempered by the concern that the 
core measures of cultural and institutional influence are in the level of the taken-for-granted. 
They are generally more implicit than the actors know or wish to acknowledge. Therefore, 
managerial perceptions may or may not be able to pick up the full scope of institutional 
pressures. For example, the influence of banks, insurance companies or investors may be less 
obvious to managerial action than the pressures of regulators or activists. Further, survey 
analyses based on managers interpretations of external pressure will naturally tend to uncover 
discrete network ties or resource connections and will be less likely to uncover sources of 
normative and cognitive influence that may emerge from religious institutions, academia or the 
press. Uncovering this level of influence has traditionally been a difficulty within institutional 
analyses and has led many to identify network analyses as the most reliable way to empirically 
measure institutional phenomena.  
To some extent, empirical limitations will require that a study of institutional influences 
on organizational action include considerations for direct network influences beyond sources of 
normative and cognitive influence (Scott, 1991). In effect, studies will, by nature, rely more on 
the regulative and normative influences of the institutional field and the artifactual responses that 
are manifested within the organization. To compensate for this deficiency, in-depth case studies 




The context of environmental protection is an excellent domain for studying the shifting 
form of institutional and cultural forms. The definition of corporate environmental practice has 
been highly contested over the past four decades and represents a high degree of field level 
conflict and change. For example, in 1970, Friedman (1970) wrote that “expenditures on 
reducing pollution beyond the amount that is in the best interests of the corporation or that is 
required by law in order to contribute to the social objective of improving the environment ... [is] 
pure and unadulterated socialism ... There is one and only one social responsibility of business; 
to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays 
within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without 
deception or fraud." This article examines how the "rules of the game" have changed. It presents 
an institutional and cultural model for understanding how the meaning of "increased profits" and 
the actions which managers take for the benefit of their investors have become redefined. 
Managers acting in the best interests of their investors now consider environmental protection in 
cultural terms that merge with institutionally legitimate business concerns: capital acquisition, 
operational efficiency, market demand and others. Institutional definitions of environmental 
protection have moved out of the realm of “socially responsible management” or "regulatory 
compliance" and have entered the realm of strategic business management.  
This conclusion emerges from an institutional and cultural analysis. But, as yet few 
institutional studies have been able to capture the full complexity of the interface between field 
and organization. This paper has presented the beginnings of a model that will consider this 
linkage in more richness. It proposes the co-evolution of linked systems: the institutional field, 
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the cultural frames employed to describe environmental issues and the cultural and structural 
organizational response. Our task as researchers is to develop models that capture the source of 
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